

Qaiyum Khan and the War of Kashmir, 1947-48 AD

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At the time of partition of India, there were hundreds of Princely States, the rulers of which were given the option to accede either to India or Pakistan keeping in view the demographic and geographic situation of their states. The Kashmir state was geographically linked to both Pakistan and India but her natural communication links were passing through Pakistan and the majority of population was also Muslims, however, the Dogra Maharaja was reluctant to join Pakistan. When the tales of freedom reached Kashmir, the Muslim population of the state became restive and the people of Poonch revolted against the Maharaja. Maharaja forces, strengthened by the arrival of troops from Patiala, started crushing the Muslims with heavy hand.

Key Words: Division of India, Kashmir accession, uprising, tribal invasion, Pakistan-India war, United Nations.

When the tales of cruelties on Kashmiris reached tribesmen, they were greatly angered. They were also encouraged by Qaiyum Khan to participate in the Jihad in Kashmir. Thus tribesmen rushed to the help of Kashmiri brothers. With the arrival of tribesmen the Maharaja forces were unable to resist this onslaught, which forced him to ask for military help from India. India agreed on the condition of Kashmir's accession by the Maharaja, which India claimed he did. With the arrival of Indian forces the irregular Kashmiri Muslims and tribesmen forces could not stand the ground so Pakistan sent her regular army to defend the already liberated territories of Kashmir, which resulted in the first Pakistan-India War. No doubt tribesmen liberated the present Azad Kashmir but some of them were also involved in unethical and immoral activities.

At the time of the partition of India, there were more than 600 princely states in India, which were not directly administered by the British rulers, though indirectly they were governed by them. In the 3rd June Plan it was decided that these princely states' rulers would accede either to India or Pakistan keeping in mind the geographical contiguity and peoples' religious beliefs. Kashmir was the only state which was geographically contiguous to both countries but the population was more than 77% Muslims, which was thus (as majority of the Muslims of the state believed) more likely to join Pakistan. However, the *Maharaja*, who was a *Dogra* Hindu, did not show any sign of joining Pakistan. Rather his first choice was remaining independent but in worst case scenario wanted to join India. When his Prime Minister advised him to be cognizant of his peoples' wishes he asked for his resignation. Due to *Maharaja* biased and cruel policies the people of Kashmir revolted against him. Since the *Maharaja* was also having the support of some fellow rulers, he became more ruthless in crushing the rebellion. When the stories of atrocities of *Maharaja* Forces on Muslims reached

the tribal areas of Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa, the tribesmen rushed for the help of their helpless Muslim brothers. This turned the tables on *Maharaja* and his supporters. When unable to control the situation he requested the Government of India for military support, which they readily provided.

In the Kashmir War Qaiyum Khan has played a very important role. At the time of the war he was the Chief Minister of Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa (former NWFP). In this capacity he became very important in the war of Kashmir because in the first Kashmir War after the creation of Pakistan, Pakhtoon tribesmen played a significant role, being Chief Minister of the Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa, he was having greater access to the tribal areas, being adjacent. Further, in order to go to Kashmir the tribesmen had to go through the Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa territories. Had Qaiyum Khan not been friendly or not in favour of Kashmir War, he could have created problems in the smooth journey of tribesmen towards Kashmir. Officially the Government of Pakistan showed neutrality, though reports are there that the central government was indirectly involved. Thus Qaiyum Khan became the focal person for *Jihad* activities as he was the only important government functionary who was openly in favour of *Jihad* in Kashmir.

As Chief Minister of the Province he facilitated the tribesmen Jihad efforts by not only making their journey easier but also provided them arms and ammunition. Though there is no denying the fact that Qaiyum Khan has played an important role in the Kashmir War, it becomes debatable when his role is critically evaluated because then certain points come to the forefront, which puts a question mark on his sincerity and intelligence in the Kashmir War. Rather some politicians and analysts hold him responsible for the lingering of the dispute.

The Kashmir War

Like the use of *Pakhtoonistan* issue to crush the *Khudai Khidmatgars* in the Frontier, it is generally believed that Qaiyum Khan also exploited the Kashmir issue for political ends. When the problem of Kashmir emerged on the eve of independence in 1947, after the *Maharaja* of the state used

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force to crush the revolt, Qaiyum Khan became one of the strongest proponents of the tribesmen going there to help their Muslim Kashmiri brothers. Actually, the princely State of Kashmir emerged as a bone of contention between Pakistan and India soon after the partition. Pakistan was convinced that Kashmir, which was a predominantly Muslim state, would join Pakistan. (Salim 1993: 102) The subsequent developments in Kashmir were also in favour of Pakistan. For instance, on 17 July 1947 the All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (AJKMC) held a convention in Srinagar, at the residence of Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan, Founder-President of the Azad Kashmir Government, wherein majority of the participants decided "in favour of an unqualified accession of the State to Pakistan". However, there was also a group, led by Chaudhri Hamidullah Khan, the then acting President of AJKMC, which was in favour of remaining independent of both India and Pakistan. (Ibrahim 1990: 41 & Suhrawardy 1983: 103)

At that time, the situation in Srinagar was very volatile and uncertain, and was rapidly changing. In August 1947, the then Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir State, Pandit Ram Chand Kak, visited Delhi, and met the Viceroy, the Congress leaders and Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. When he came back to Srinagar, he advised the *Maharaja*: "to remain neutral for the moment and sign a standstill agreement both with India and Pakistan. Pandit Kak also advised him to let Pakistan operate the Postal and Telegraph services. He then went on to advise the *Maharaja* to ultimately find out the wishes of his Muslim population on the issue of accession. If the Muslim population, being in majority in the State, wished to accede to Pakistan, he should then accede to Pakistan." (Ibrahim 1990: 43-44 & 48) However, the *Maharaja* did not agree and he asked his prime minister to resign, and appointed General Janak Sing as prime minister. After that the *Maharaja* started receiving top leaders of All-India National Congress, including Mahatma Gandhi and Kirpalani. (Ibrahim 1990: 43-44)

Though the *Maharaja* of Kashmir was trying hard to keep the situation under control, it was becoming increasingly difficult. The first sign of this loss of control showed up in Poonch some time in June 1947, when the people of the area refused to pay taxes, which had been imposed on the Muslims while the Hindus and Sikhs were exempted. These taxes had created strong resentment among the Muslim population because:

There was a tax on every hearth and every window. Every, cow, buffalo and sheep was taxed and even every wife. Finally the Zaildari tax was introduced to pay for the cost of taxation, and Dogra [Hindu] troops were billeted on the [Muslim] Poonchis to enforce collection. (Alastair 2002: 121) Initially, the revolt was confined to the Bagh district of Poonch, but by the time of the transfer of power, it had spread to different parts of the State. The revolt coincided with "special 'Kashmir Day", which had been commemorated in British India since the Srinagar crisis of 1931 when the

Maharaja's men had fired into a crowd and killed a score of protestors." This time, Srinagar saw greater number of display of Pakistani flags with increased public excitement. The State government responded by excessive use of police force, resulting in many casualties. (Alastair 2002: 121-122)

Soon, the revolt started spreading far and wide. Meetings and processions were held at different places. One such meeting was held on 26 August 1947 at Bagh on which the State police opened fire; the participants paid back in the same coin. After this incident, the leading figure of the revolt, Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan, along with some friends, went into hiding in the nearby forest and sent messages to different people saying that the "open conflict had now started between the Muslims of Poonch and the *Maharaja*..." (Alastair 2002: 122-123)

With the spread of the protests/insurgency, the situation went out of *Maharaja's* control. In spite of the fact that the *Maharaja* of Patiala, a fellow Sikh ruler of Patiala State, had sent his state army to Kashmir to help the Maharaja and his troops. These forces had arrived in Kashmir much before the arrival of Pathan tribesmen. (Alastair 2002: 91) Government of India also sent a serving Indian Military Officer, Lt. Colonel Kashmir Singh Katoch, to Kashmir in response to Jammu and Kashmir government's request of 13 September 1947. The officer, besides being a serving Indian Army officer, was the son of Jammu and Kashmir Prime Minister, Major-General Janak Singh. Kashmir Singh played a significant role in the subsequent developments. Thus from the month of September onwards, Indian military and political involvement had increased manifold. (Alastair 2002: 129-130)

The *Maharaja*, now feeling stronger with the support of Indians, let loose the State forces in collusion with Patiala State forces, Hindu extremist party, Rashtrya Sevak Sang (RSS) workers and other gangs to spread terror by resorting to loot, rape and torture of Muslim Kashmiris in the Poonch area. The result was a widespread rebellion by the people of Poonch on 6 October 1947. (Ibrahim 1990: 49-51) The *Maharaja's* troops tried to control the rebellion with utmost severity and force. This further deteriorated the situation. The tales of cruelties reached the Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa and the tribal areas. The result was a strong resentment amongst the *Pakhtoons*. Qaiyum Khan, the Chief Minister of the province, did not hesitate to support and encourage them to go to the Kashmir and wage *Jihad* against the oppressors who were following a policy of Muslim genocide in Kashmir. Thus, the tribesmen started infiltrating into Kashmir. (Salim 1993: 102)

When the Governor of Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa, Sir George Cunningham, received the news, he informed Sir Robert Lockhart, the then Commander-in-Chief of Indian Army, about the intended invasion of Kashmir by tribesmen and expressed his inability to stop them. (The Pakistan Times 8 August 1948: 5) The *Maharaja* soon found himself unable

to resist the onslaught of the tribes and Azad Kashmir forces. He called for direct Indian help, which they were more than happy to receive, and hastened to move their troops into Kashmir. (Akbar 1975: 27)

To seek Indian intervention, R.L. Batra, the Deputy Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, was sent to Delhi. He carried *Maharaja* and the Prime Minister's letters. Though the *Maharaja's* letter had some reference of Kashmir's accession to India, it was not without conditions. On Batra's handing over of letters to the Government of India, the Defence Committee of Indian Government met on 25 October 1947, under the Chairmanship of Lord Mountbatten to discuss the possibility of extending military support to the *Maharaja*. The Committee readily decided to send Indian army troops. However, Mountbatten raised two key points: "First: accession had to come before intervention. Second: such accession would require subsequent ratification by the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir; pending which, it could only be considered as provisional." (Alastair 2002: 144-148)

The Indian troops landed in Srinagar on 27 October 1947. The Indian Government claimed that this was done after the *Maharaja* signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947. This, however does not seem to be true as the person (V.P. Menon), who claimed to have got the signature of the Maharaja on the Instrument, was in Delhi on 26 October and had a meeting with Alexander Symon, the British Deputy High Commissioner there. Alexander Symon confirms that V.P. Menon was scheduled to go to Srinagar, but could not. Thus, the most probable date of Maharaja signing the Instrument of Accession, (if he ever signed it), was 27 October 1947, when the Indian troops had already landed in Srinagar. Even the *Maharaja's* signing of the Instrument is very much doubted by the British historian, Alastair Lamb. He writes, "...the published exchange of *Maharaja*-Mountbatten letters relating to Accession is fundamentally flawed..." (Alastair 2002: 156-157 & 167)

When the Indian troops landed in Kashmir, the Prime Minister of Pakistan convened a meeting to discuss the Kashmir situation in the changed circumstances on 27 October 1947. This meeting was attended by Iskander Mirza (then Defense Secretary, later to be Governor-General), Chaudhri Mohammad Ali (then Secretary-General, later to be Prime Minister), Nawab of Mamdot, Chief Minister of the Punjab, Brigadier Sher Khan, Maj. General Akbar Khan and Qaiyum Khan, Chief Minister of the Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa. (Akbar 1975: 27)

During the course of discussions, General Akbar Khan proposed action in Jammu as the war in Kashmir had broken out and the tribesmen had penetrated Kashmir for around 80 miles. However, as the Government of Pakistan was not involved directly in the uprising, and was careful not to provoke India into a war, all except Qaiyum Khan and the Nawab of Mamdot opposed this proposal. (Akbar 1975: 28-

29) However, unofficially, later on, Qaiyum Khan used all his influence to help the *Mujahidin* who wanted to go to the war front and take part in the Kashmir War. According to some, Qaiyum Khan also had the backing of Quaid-i-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan in his Kashmir War policy. (Abbasi Interview, 28 November 1999)

Actually Qaiyum Khan himself was a Kashmiri whose father, due to government service, had left his ancestral land, Kashmir, to settle down in the Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa. Thus Qaiyum Khan had an emotional attachment with Kashmir. He was of the opinion that without the tribals' intervention Kashmir could not be rescued. Qaiyum Khan had also an ambition to rule his ancestral land. (Wali Khan 1994: 80-81 & Hoti Interview, 18 June 2001) Besides having Kashmiri patriotic feelings, there were other reasons too for Qaiyum Khan's interest in Kashmir. He was also afraid of the tribesmen's involvement in the Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa politics. Which is why, Qaiyum Khan wanted to engage them in Kashmir before they could divert their attention to the Frontier politics, and he very shrewdly and successfully did it. (Afrasayat Interview, 28 June 2001)

Once the tribal invasion started, more and more people were attracted towards the war in Kashmir. Tales of Muslims' taking different parts of the State were alluring, and thus numerous people of tribal territory, Swat, Bajaur, Chitral, Dir, etc., started moving towards Kashmir, fully armed and ready to fight. (Special Branch daily dairy 15 October 1947: bundle no. 50, s.no. 816) Tribesmen, both from settled and tribal areas, held meetings at different places, and made preparations for going to the warfront. Those who wanted to go were provided free arms, ammunition, transport, and ration at Peshawar. (Special Branch daily dairy 16 October 1947: bundle no. 50, s.no. 816 & Special Branch daily dairy 17 October 1947: bundle no. 50, s.no. 816)

In November 1947, appeals for more and more volunteers also appeared on the walls of the city through posters and through the advertisements in newspapers. One such poster "*Quaid-i-Kashmir ki Appeal*", was published by weekly '*Shorah*' at Peshawar. In this poster, Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan had appealed to the people to join the Free Kashmir Army. (CID daily dairy no. 244, 3 November 1947: bundle no. 50, s.no. 816) Then, on 10 November 1947 an article entitled, "*Inshallah* victory is surely ours" was published in "*Mazloom Duniya*". The article was written by its editor, Abdur Rehman Raya and highlighted the atrocities of non-Muslims over Muslims in India and Kashmir and the Muslims were urged to join the Holy War against the infidels. (CID daily dairy no. 244, 11 November 1947: bundle no. 50, s.no. 816)

The Manchester Guardian, on the authority of an Indian source, estimated that about 75,000 tribesmen were involved in the Kashmir War, of whom around 25,000 were active participants. According to this report, "They are armed with .303 rifles, Bren and Sten guns and medium machine-

guns. They used infantry tactics resembling the German methods of World War 1 and paid heavily for the departure from their tradition. In one engagement, it was believed 2,000 were killed.” (Khalid 1998: 80)

The most active religio-political party in the Kashmir war in Pakistan was the *Najia* Party of *Maulvi* Mohammad Amin. In order to enable him to send people to the warfront, Qaiyum Khan had issued special instructions to the police stations saying that those who carried a chit from *Maulvi* Mohammad Amin should be allowed to carry weapons and should not be asked about permit or license. In March 1948, it was reported that he, while preaching *Jihad*, issued chits to such members of the party who volunteered to go to the Kashmir front on payment of two rupees four annas as subscription. It was understood that the bearer of the chit could carry arms with a license. He issued 140 chits in all. (Special Branch, May 1952: bundle no. 16, s.no. 250, pp. 289-90)

Maulvi Mohammad Amin also visited Karachi in October 1948, and during this visit, the Governor-General of Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin, sanctioned to him the purchase of 2000 rifles of .303 caliber for the purpose of *Jihad* to be used in Kashmir. To arrange the funds for such purchase, he, again, started subscriptions. However, according to the reports, the rifles were either sold to the followers on cost or were issued to those who intended to go for *Jihad* in Kashmir from the ‘*Baitul Mal*’ of the party. (Special Branch, 20 October 1948: bundle no. 22, s.no. 297, p. 291)

The Frontier Government was apparently involved directly in arming and sending the tribesmen. This was claimed by Arbab Hidayatullah, ex-Deputy Inspector-General of Police (Special Branch), in an interview, saying that during the Governorship of Qurban Ali (1954-55), he was specially deputed by the Governor to verify all the rifles, etc of the levies. The Governor had been told or had the suspicion that, after the Kashmir War, the tribesmen, while returning the weapons, had replaced the original parts of the rifles with the local made parts. This showed that the provincial government had issued those weapons to the tribesmen going to the Front. (Hidayatullah Interview, 25 June 2001)

Major Khurshid, the commander of the Muslim League National Guards, played an important role in organizing the tribesmen for the Kashmir War. According to Mohammad Ali Khan of Hoti, one day he came to his house and handed him over a briefcase with 30,000 rupees in it and told him to keep it at a safe place because that was the money for organizing tribesmen for the Kashmir War. Subsequently, Mohammad Ali Khan Hoti, Major Khurshid, Pir Manki and other leaders went into tribal areas and other parts of the province and prepared people for *Jihad* and thus people started going to Kashmir front. (Hoti Interview, 18 June 2001)

When the War in Kashmir broke out, the Muslims in Pakistan in general, and the tribal people in particular, were

very much sympathetic towards the Kashmiris and were anxious about their fate. Ian Stephen, the editor of *Statesman*, Calcutta, wrote that when the Muslims of Poonch went to the tribal areas to purchase weapons, they narrated stories of cruelty and barbarism of the Dogra army to the tribesmen, which greatly disturbed them. This aroused sympathy among tribesmen for their Muslim brethren in Kashmir. Many *mullahs* also gave calls for *Jihad*, and thus the tribals were motivated for the war against *Maharaja* of Kashmir. (Suhrawardy 1983: 113-114) According to some historians, the tribesmen were also told that they could plunder the conquered villages and collect war booty. (Salim 1993: 103) But, more importantly, the policy of the Government of Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa was to encourage the tribesmen to go to Kashmir. Qaiyum Khan, the Chief Minister, not only allowed the tribal *lashkars*’ march to Kashmir but also facilitated the march of thousands of Afghan *Pawindas* to Kashmir for a *Jihad*. (Rashid 1977: 127-128)

Those who were heading towards *Jihad* in Kashmir were full of enthusiasm and vigour. They used to sing a song, which was mixture of Pashto and Hindko:

Jang La zam rawan yama (I am going to War)

Jang la zam pakhpala (I am going to the War on my

own)

Naukar mai sa la zee (Why should my servant go)

Hees parwah mai neeshta (I don’t care)

Chai spahee da Pakistan yama (As I am the soldier of Pakistan)

Lasee mangai teri maan (Your mother asks for yogurt drink)

Atta goondai meri maan (My mother kneads flour)

Jang la zam rawan yama (I am going to the War) (Sufi Interview, 18 November 1999)

It is believed that, while Qaiyum Khan organized tribal raids, the National Guards’ leader, Major Khurshid Anwar and his friends, were given the task of attacking the *Maharaja* forces and police around Mirpur and surrounding areas. In this manner, they wanted to divert the attention of the forces from the main attack. (Wali Khan 1994: 97-98) However, unfortunately, when the two groups closed in on Srinagar, differences surfaced between them as to who would lead the triumphant entry into Srinagar. Both wanted to lead the march into the city. The dispute dragged on, and it was decided that, until the issue was settled, they would not attack Srinagar. Thus, precious time was wasted, which was obviously utilized by the *Maharaja* and Indians to their advantage. (Wali Khan 1994: 101-102, Hoti Interview, 18 June 2001 & Fida Interview, 14 June 2001)

Fida Mohammad Khan, the leading Muslim Leaguer and ex-Governor of Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa, who himself participated in the Kashmir War, claimed that he was on the Srinagar front, and it was just within their reach. But Qaiyum Khan and Major Khurshid wrangled among themselves and the tribesmen were kept waiting. Later on, they were called

back, and thus was lost Srinagar. (Fida Interview, 14 June 2001) Mohammad Ali Khan of Hoti was of the opinion that Qaiyum Khan was planning on presenting Srinagar as an *Eid* gift to Quaid-i-Azam. His strategy was to capture the city through the Frontier Police instead of doing it through the tribesmen because, in that situation, the credit would have gone to Major Khurshid. For the realization of this goal, he sent Khushdil Khan, a Superintendent of Police, hailing from Bannu, to the tribesmen, and recalled them from the front, and in this way Qaiyum Khan lost Srinagar. (Hoti Interview, 18 June 2001)

When the Indian forces reached Srinagar, and they started attacking the tribesmen, the latter were unable to fight the regular army, especially in the open fields. The result was that the tribesmen started retreating. When the news reached Qaiyum Khan, he rushed to Abbottabad along with other notables and tried to convince the tribesmen not to give up the fight but, to no avail. The tribesmen could not carry on any more. In a desperate move, he, along with Nawab of Mamdot, contacted Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan and asked him to take the command of the fighting forces, though unofficially. (Akbar 1975: 46)

Though the Government of Pakistan apparently maintained a neutral policy towards the War in Kashmir, it could not be indifferent to the situation. Qaiyum Khan and his provincial government were actively involved and helped the tribesmen. During the War, Mountbatten and Ismay went to Lahore for a meeting with Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and discussed the Kashmir War. Ismay recalls the meeting in these words: "Jinnah did at least admit some responsibility for their (tribesmen) activities when he said that, if the Indian troops were removed, he would pull out the Pathans." (Zeiglar 1985: 448)

Indeed, Qaiyum Khan never minced his words while talking about his involvement in the Kashmir War in later years. In a series of statements during 1950-51, he openly criticized India and the United Nations for their role in Kashmir. He criticized the UN for its inaction in Kashmir. He also blamed the Indians for not holding plebiscite in the State. Qaiyum Khan even demanded practical help from the Muslim countries in Kashmiris fight against India. Qaiyum Khan also criticized the British Commonwealth for her appeasement policy towards India, and he even suggested to the government of Pakistan to break away from that organization if it failed to solve the Kashmir problem during January 1951 London Commonwealth Conference. (The Pakistan Times, Lahore, 2 November 1947, Dawn, Karachi, 3 September 1950 & 14 January 1951 & Khyber Mail, Peshawar, 11-12 January 1951)

The *Khudai Khidmatgars* and *Zalmai Pakhtoos* were against the War in Kashmir. They actively propagated against the War throughout the province. (Special branch, daily diary no. 16, serial no. 252) Similarly, the *Ahrars* were also against the *Jihad* in Kashmir. Maulana Ghulam Ghaus of Baffa was of

the opinion that, from religious point of view, *Jihad* in Palestine should be given preference over *Jihad* in Kashmir. (Special branch, 19 July 1948, Bundle no. 78, s.no. 1417)

During the War in Kashmir, some tribesmen were involved in loot, plunder and kidnapping of young girls in Kashmir. (Special branch, Ext. diary no. 6, 8 March 1949, Bundle no. 22, s.no. 294, p. 81)

Even the *Ghiljis* were reported to have plundered people in Pakistani Punjab. (Special branch, 21 February 1948, Bundle no. 77, s.no. 1401) Some *Mujahideen* were accused of highway robberies. One such incident was reported at Burhan, District Campbellpur (presently Attock), when a Rawalpindi bound bus from Nowshera was stopped by them and the passengers were robbed of their belongings. The same report further stated that massive plundering was carried out by the *Mujahideen* in Gujrat district. (Special branch, 6 March 1948, Bundle no. 79, s.no. 1432) Qaiyum Khan, during a discussion on the Kashmir War, confessed on the floor of the Provincial Assembly, that dacoities had taken place in the garb of Kashmir *Jihad*. (Legislative Assembly Debates, 17 March 1949, vol. xvii, official report, s.no. 290, p.24)

During the War the bringing of ammunition and tea from Kashmir also went on unabated. (Special branch, 8 April 1948, Bundle no. 79, s.no. 1434) Some of the tribesmen from Mahsuds and Wazir clans were also involved in smuggling arms to the Punjab under the guise of Kashmir *Jihad*; they used to carry arms in the batches of 2 or 3 persons pretending that they were going to Kashmir front but, in reality, they were selling arms in the Punjab. (Special branch, 21 October 1948, Bundle no. 79, s.no. 1430)

In order to acknowledge the services of the tribesmen in general and those of the Mahsuds in particular during the Kashmir War, Qaiyum Khan also announced the construction of a housing colony for Mahsuds in his budget speech of 1949-50. While announcing this reward for their services, he stated: "the fact that in our greatest hour of danger the Mahsuds responded to our call by rushing to the rescue of the oppressed Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir state, without any remuneration, and purely out of their sense of duty to protect the weak and oppressed.... The scheme of Mahsud colonization (sic.) is but a humble token of appreciation of their wonderful services." (Symonds 1977: 126)

There is also a little known aspect of the Kashmir issue that needs some attention. Wali Khan writes that at the time when the plan to attack Kashmir was prepared, *Khan Bahadur* Quli Khan came to Ghaffar Khan to seek his and the *Khudai Khidmatgars'* help in the Kashmir War. However, Ghaffar Khan proposed that he should be given a chance to try the accession of Kashmir with Pakistan peacefully. He was of the opinion that the key to accession was in the hands of Sheikh Abdullah. And that he would work on him and convince him to side with Pakistan. He believed that though

Sheikh Abdullah belonged to the National Conference, he was not happy with the *Maharaja*. In addition to this, he was a great votary of the Indian Muslim cause, which meant he would never agree with the *Maharaja* for the accession of Kashmir to India. Ghaffar Khan said that he knew Sheikh Abdullah personally, and that he had lengthy discussions with him on the Kashmir issue, and that he would agree to join Pakistan. However, Ghaffar Khan stressed that he would need certain assurances as Sheikh Abdullah belonged to a 'nationalist' organization, like *Khudai Khidmatgar*, and that his organization was also a political rival of the Muslim League. Sheikh Abdullah would definitely have fears and suspicions because the Muslim League was in power, and what the Muslim League did to the *Khudai Khidmatgars'* in the Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa, must have left deep impact on his mind. He, therefore, demanded certain assurances to be given by Jinnah, which should include that the status of all the provinces in Pakistan would be that of federating units and that all the provinces would have equal status. The center would grant complete provincial autonomy. Ghaffar Khan said that once Sheikh Abdullah had those assurances, he would not hesitate to seek Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. Quli Khan replied that this was a good proposal but it would need some time. He needed immediate action because if that did not happen, and once India got the upper hand, it would not be possible to gain Kashmir. However, Quli Khan assured Ghaffar Khan that he would inform the higher authorities. (Wali Khan 1994: 82)

Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan, in his memoirs, has also discussed Ghaffar Khan's claim that Sheikh Abdullah could be persuaded to accede Kashmir to Pakistan. He writes: "It was doubtful whether Sheikh Abdullah would whole-heartedly support India, because his party followers would not have backed any decision on the accession issue made in a hurry. After meeting some of the Nationalist leaders in Srinagar, the writer was of the view that the best of the Nationalist were not necessarily anti-Pakistanis." (Ibrahim 1990: 43)

Conclusion

The partition of India is one such historical event which not only affected the region at that time but it continues to affect the region and indirectly the whole world even to this day. It pitched the two countries, Pakistan and India, against each other, which is very damaging to the people of both countries because both countries instead of using their resources for the betterment of the people are using most of the resources on the procurement of arms and other lethal weapons. Besides other issues, one important issue which can be considered the bone of contention between the two countries is the State of Kashmir.

Pakistan and India have fought many wars on Kashmir but no country has been able to fully control the state, rather the state is divided into Pakistan administered and Indian administered Kashmir. The problem started with the division of India and the first war over Kashmir was fought in 1947-

48. Though initially Pakistan did not engage in war directly, ultimately it was also drawn into the war, however one government functionary who from day one was directly involved was Qaiyum Khan.

There is no doubt that Qaiyum Khan has played an important role in the First Kashmir War. However, unfortunately, his personal interest and goals severely damaged the prospects of ultimate victory. Had he and Major Khurshid worked in concert, most probably, today, the State of Kashmir might have been part of Pakistan and the people of Kashmir might have been living a peaceful life. However, whatever the fate of the Kashmir issue in the years ahead might be, as far as Qaiyum Khan was concerned, he benefited from the conflict, and, was able to divert the attention of the people of Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa towards Kashmir, and away from the problems of their own province.

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